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PREVENT OVERVALUATION OF CHARITABLE 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DONATIONS OR 
INCENTIVIZE SUCH DONATIONS? 
John K. Woo* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Many scholars have criticized the American Jobs Creation Act of 
2004 (AJCA) for leaving little incentives for corporations to donate their 
intellectual property (―IP‖) to charities.
1
  A careful examination of the 
enactment of the AJCA and its associated problems, however, reveals that 
the critics are overstating the problems that currently exist. 
Most of the critics‘ concerns can be alleviated with only a slight 
modification to the current system:  allowing additional deductions for any 
monetary expenditure that corporations spend in preparing the donation.  
Further, if Congress is willing to invest a little more effort into addressing 
the concerns, it can allocate a moderate fund to create a government-
sponsored third party whose sole purpose would be to maintain a public 
―donation bank‖ of all donated IP rights.  Not only would this minimize the 
waste of government resources, but it would also be a much simpler and 
more efficient way to deal with the critics‘ concerns. 
II.  BACKGROUND – THE CREATION OF THE AJCA AND ITS ANTECEDENTS 
The AJCA was enacted to prevent corporations from abusing the tax 
deduction system when donating their IP rights to nonprofit organizations.
2
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 1. See Nancy Kilson et al., New Tax Law Limits Charitable Deductions of Intellectual 
Property, CYBERSPACE LAW, Nov. 2004, at 14, (reporting opposition to AJCA by academic 
and other nonprofit organizations who fear the new system will ―discourage‖ donations). 
 2. See Ron Layton & Peter Bloch, Please Donate Patents on the Shelf: Tax Benefits 
Can Be Focused for Greater Good, LEGAL TIMES MAG., Mar. 15, 2004, at 30 (citing abuses 
of the tax system pre-AJCA and noting a then-considered law change to remedy the 
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Prior to the AJCA, corporations had been allowed to deduct fair market 
value for their donations.
3
  As a result, they typically took excessive 
deductions for their donations.
4
  Corporations were clearly taking 
advantage of the fact that IP rights were inherently very difficult to value.
5
  
Further, only non-quantifiable benefits were found in the system prior to 
the AJCA.
6
  Therefore, many policy considerations and proposals were 
taken into account when reforming this tax deduction system.
7
 
A.  Pre-AJCA Era 
Prior to the enactment of the AJCA, corporations had great tax-based 
incentives to donate their ―orphan‖ patents.
8
  Orphan patents are 
characterized as patents that:  1) are not consistent with a company‘s core 
technology or mission; 2) are not appropriate for licensing to third parties; 
and 3) have no value for defensive purposes in competitive markets.
9
 
Corporations were allowed to revalue their patents before making 
donations and had the patents‘ fair market value deducted from their taxes 
for the donations.
10
  They were allowed to ignore the patent‘s book value, 
which in most cases was zero, and estimate the present value of future 
potential income stream.
11
  Because this system was subjective and 
unreliable, corporations began to abuse the system.  Instead of abandoning 
their inactive, but potentially useful IP rights, corporations simply donated 
 
problem). 
 3. 26 U.S.C.S. § 170(e)(1)(B)(iii) (2009) (―The amount of any charitable contribution 
of property otherwise taken into account under this section shall be reduced by the sum of, 
in the case of a charitable contribution, of any patent, copyright . . . trademark, trade name, 
trade secret, know-how, software . . . or similar property, or applications or registrations of 
such property . . . the amount of gain which would have been long-term capital gain if the 
property contributed had been sold by the taxpayer at its fair market value (determined at 
the time of such contribution).‖). 
 4. See Layton & Bloch, supra note 2, at 30 (noting that corporations are permitted to 
disregard the book value of a patent and make subjective valuations of present value of 
future revenue). 
 5. Richard F. Riley, Jr. & Terri W. Cammarano, New Restrictions (and Opportunities) 
in Donating Patents and Other Intellectual Property, 16 TAX‘N OF EXEMPTS 216, 217 (2005) 
(―The basis of donated intellectual property may be relatively easy to determine if the 
taxpayer purchased the property from a third party, but computing the basis in self-created 
patents, trademarks, and other types of intellectual property may involve difficult issues of 
allocating research and development expenses and other internal costs.‖). 
 6. See Layton & Bloch, supra note 2, at 30 (stating that non-quantifiable benefits 
include:  the expansion of university-corporate relationships, boosts to inventor morale, and 
greater opportunities for faculty). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
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them to nonprofit organizations, such as universities.
12
 
Corporations were able to save substantial amounts of money through 
these deductions.  For example, when Dow Chemical discovered that 25% 
of their patents had no business value, they were able to save more than 
$40 million in five years by downsizing their portfolio by over 10,000 
patents.
13
  In addition, the donations of the unused IP rights have resulted in 
a tremendous amount of money in tax credits over the past several years.
14
  
According to calculations by M-Cam, who specializes in valuing and 
auditing patents, corporations received $3.8 billion in tax deductions for 
donating patents that may have had no commercial value at all.
15
 
These numbers speak volumes.  The money saved by these 
corporations, for doing nothing more than donating their unused and 
useless patents, is money lost by the government because of its inability to 
collect taxes on such items.  The government estimates that the decreased 
deductions with the AJCA will increase tax revenues by over $300 million 
per year.
16
 
B.  Policy Considerations and Congress’ Concerns 
The concern for overvaluation, along with other policy considerations, 
eventually led to the enactment of the AJCA.  One of those policy 
considerations was a desire to increase the number and size of research 
grants accompanying donated patents by allowing higher level bonus tax 
deductions for such grants.
17
  The rationale was to give universities and 
other similar nonprofit organizations flexibility in developing donated 
patents and to encourage corporations to donate to them.
18
  An option that 
Congress considered was to limit deductions to the book value of the 
orphan IP rights.
19
 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See, e.g., Ashlea Ebeling, Washington Blocks Patent Tax Breaks, FORBES.COM (Jan. 
7, 2004), http://www.forbes.com/2004/01/07/cz_ae_0107beltway.html (showing that 
DuPont donated patents valued at $64 million to Penn State, the University of Iowa and 
Virginia Tech; Caterpillar donated $50 million in patents to Mid-America 
Commercialization Corporation; and Kellogg donated $49 million). 
 15. Lesley Craig & Lindsay Moore, Making Patent Donations Work, INTELL. ASSET 
MGMT., http://www.buildingipvalue.com/05_NA/167_170.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2010). 
 16. John Dubiansky, Comment, Tax Treatment of Patent Donations in Post-JOBS Act 
World, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 295, 303 (2004). 
 17. Layton & Bloch, supra note 2, at 30. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See id. (suggesting that ―we should not . . . eliminate a policy that encourages 
invention without considering‖ the kinds of donations that will increase innovation, the 
likely costs those policies would impose, and other alternatives that could salvage the loss of 
technologies through patent abandonment). 
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Ultimately, however, Congress focused on two main concerns when 
they decided to modify the tax deduction system by enacting the AJCA.
20
  
The first concern was the inherent difficulty in determining the fair market 
value of IP rights.
21
  The second concern was that nonprofit organizations 
receiving the donated patents or other IP rights would not have the 
expertise or the resources to effectively utilize such rights, even if the rights 
were substantially valuable.
22
 
C.  The AJCA 
In addressing the difficulty of valuing IP rights, Congress limited the 
tax deduction for donated IP to either the lesser of the taxpayer‘s basis in 
the contributed property or the fair market value of the property.
23
  By 
promulgating this new rule for the initial deduction, Congress was trying to 
balance the benefits of donating IP rights with the unjustifiable gains of the 
donors.  Apparently, in Congress‘ mind, the gains did not match the 
benefits to the donees or to society. 
To maintain corporations‘ incentives to continue donating to nonprofit 
organizations, however, Congress allowed additional deductions over the 
following nine years.
24
  This secondary deduction is proportionate to the 
actual benefits produced by the charity, such as royalties, in subsequent 
years.
25
  Some technicalities include the requirement of obtaining a 
qualified appraisal if the deduction is greater than $5000, and the 
requirement that the taxpayer attach the appraisal to his return if the 
deduction is greater than $500,000.
26
 
Nevertheless, even with this added incentive, there have been many 
criticisms of the AJCA‘s ability to incentivize corporations to donate. 
III.  PROBLEMS WITH THE AJCA 
After the enactment of the AJCA, many academics and nonprofit 
organizations have criticized the AJCA for creating problems of its own.  
As previously noted, these critics believe that the corporations now have 
very little incentive to donate their IP rights because of the severe 
limitations on the tax deductions placed by the AJCA.
27
 
 
 20. Riley, Jr. & Cammarano, supra note 5, at 216. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 216-17. 
 24. Id. at 217. 
 25. Wendy C. Gerzog, From the Greedy to the Needy, 87 OR. L. REV. 1133, 1143 
(2008). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Kilson et al., supra note 1, at 14. 
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On the contrary, others argue that the current AJCA system 
encourages donors to find a charity that is a good fit so that they can take 
advantage of the secondary deductions, which are less limited than the 
initial deduction.
28
  However, finding a good fit would require the donors to 
conduct due diligence on the prospective donees to ensure that they have 
the desire and capability to effectively use the donated IP.
29
 
In light of these criticisms, many scholars have made proposals 
focused on changing the current AJCA deduction system and fixing the 
overvaluation and incentive problems associated with it.  Unfortunately, 
none of these proposals are very convincing.  With only a slight 
modification to the current system, however, all the major concerns of the 
academics would cease to exist.  Additionally, if Congress is willing, a 
more substantial reformation through the creation of a third party 
institution would help solve the problems in contention even more 
effectively. 
A.  Incentive Problems in Donating IP 
Some scholars argue in favor of the old deduction system:  allowing 
fair market value deduction for donated patents in order to encourage 
beneficial donations.
30
  Even though the purpose of the legislation was to 
prevent corporations from overvaluing charitable IP donations, some 
scholars believe that fair market value charitable deduction is necessary ―to 
encourage donations of IP to museums, libraries, universities, hospitals, 
research institutions, and other charities.‖
31
  These scholars believe that the 
current system does not provide enough incentive for corporations to 
donate their unused IP rights.
32
  They believe the administrative burden, 
along with the uncertainty of the value of tax deductions, would 
disincentivize corporations from donating their IP rights to charities.
33
 
 
 28. Riley & Cammarano, supra note 5, at 218 (―These new rules should provide a 
powerful incentive for patentholders and owners of other intellectual property to ensure that 
they donate property that is likely to generate real monetary value to the charity in the form 
of a stream of royalties or other income.‖). 
 29. Id. at 218. 
 30. William A. Drennan, Charitable Donations of Intellectual Property: The Case for 
Retaining the Fair Market Value Tax Deduction, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1045, 1131 (2004) 
(arguing that if a ―big company‖ could obtain fair market value deduction for contributing 
the patent to a charity, such as UC-Berkeley, that is ready to develop the beneficial product, 
such as disease resistant rice, the tax deduction could encourage the beneficial donation). 
 31. Id. at 1053. 
 32. Kilson, supra note 1, at 14. 
 33. Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Giving Intellectual Property, 39 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1721, 1762-63 (2006) (noting that requiring donors to ―conduct their own 
research and due diligence to determine, with a high degree of certainty, whether a 
particular donee will use the intellectual property donation directly to yield monetary 
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Proponents of the pre-AJCA system go even one step further in 
arguing that the previous deduction system ―allowed developing 
corporations to save money‖ and that ―more research on other projects 
could be conducted with the tax dollars saved due to the donation[s].‖
34
  
Others have argued that Congress only focused on dollar signs to recapture 
the tax deductions, but did not take other factors into considerations.
35
  
Some critics, for example, argue that corporations may actually lose money 
by making donations because there are certain costs for determining the 
value of IP rights and finding the right fit, both of which are necessary 
precursors for donating.
36
 
In other words, the argument is that administrative costs of donating 
may exceed the amount saved through the tax deductions.  If this were true, 
simple economics tells us that corporations would obviously not donate.  
Further, the total amount saved through the deduction process may still not 
be worth both a corporation‘s time and effort to pursue the donation if the 
net gain were minimal.  So even without a net negative result per se, 
corporations may still be discouraged from donating their IP rights. 
B.  Burdens on the Donees 
Further complications arise because the AJCA assumes that 
universities or other nonprofit organizations would be willing to accept 
donations even though the AJCA requires more paperwork and reporting.
37
  
Critics thus argue that under the new system, charities would not want to 
accept any unmarketable interests.
38
  The additional administrative burdens 
placed on the donees, along with the uncertainty of the value that the 
donated IP rights may potentially bring to the donees, would discourage the 
donees from accepting the donations.
39
 
Critics believe that other means beside the AJCA were available in 
resolving these issues.
40
  They believe that Congress could have dealt with 
the problems and concerns without completely revamping the pre-existing 
 
results[] . . . imposes heavy administrative burdens.‖). 
 34. Nicholas C. Tomlinson, Tax Abuse Halting Progress? An Inside Look at Patent 
Donations and Their Tax Deductibility, 35 SW. U. L. REV. 183, 203 (2006). 
 35. Id. (arguing that Congress did not estimate the costs to businesses, charities and the 
economy that will result from the AJCA). 
 36. Id. at 203-04. 
 37. Id. at 204. 
 38. Gerzog, supra note 25, at 1174. 
 39. See Nguyen & Maine, supra note 33, at 1763 (requiring the charitable donee to file 
an annual information return reporting their qualified donee income and other specified 
information.). 
 40. Tomlinson, supra note 34, at 206 (―More structured reporting and standards for 
valuation would go far to prevent future abuse without discouraging donation or impeding 
progress.‖). 
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tax deduction system that provided significant incentives for corporations 
to donate their IP rights.
41
 
C.  Waste and Relationships 
Critics also argue that the AJCA will effectively end the opportunity 
for nonprofit organizations to develop potentially valuable but unused 
technology, forcing it to go to waste.
42
  They believe the aforementioned 
incentive problems, in particular, would lead to this result.
43
 
Critics of the AJCA have also suggested that the current tax deduction 
system could potentially have a negative impact on the relationship 
between the nonprofit university donees and the corporation donors.
44
  For 
example, with the current AJCA structure, corporations that continue to 
donate would spend a significant amount of resources in performing due 
diligence on the donees in hope of more substantial tax deductions in the 
subsequent years.
45
  The corporation would be displeased if the nonprofit 
organizations did not use such donations in the best possible way because 
that would in essence eliminate the corporations‘ chance of obtaining more 
deductions in the years to follow.
46
 
IV.  DO THE PROBLEMS REALLY EXIST? 
Before creating solutions to fix the problems, we need to first examine 
whether the AJCA system really does provide less incentive for companies 
to donate and whether it really does create waste; and if so, to what extent 
those problems exist. 
A.  Incentive Problems – Revisited 
Although the critics‘ arguments all have valid points, donating patents 
may still provide benefits of their own.  Thus, the incentives for 
corporations to donate may still exist, even under the current AJCA 
structure. 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Nguyen & Maine, supra note 33, at 1755 (―[E]liminating a fair market value 
deduction will ‗effectively end the opportunity for academic and scientific professionals at 
nonprofit research institutions and universities to develop valuable technologies acquired 
through patent donations from U.S. companies for which the technology is no longer a part 
of their strategic business plans.‘‖ (quoting CCH, AMERICAN JOBS CREATION ACT OF 2004:  
LAW, EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS 432 (2004))). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Riley & Cammarano, supra note 5, at 218. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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As noted before, the IP rights that are being donated are mostly 
―orphan‖ IP rights.
47
  If such rights had not been donated, they would most 
likely have been abandoned because of the sheer cost associated with 
maintaining their portfolios.
48
  Empirical evidence even suggests that a 
majority of the patents prove to be worthless and impose the largest costs 
toward the end of the patent‘s life.
49
  Before the tax deduction system was 
realized, avoiding the majority of such costs simply meant allowing the 
patents or other IP rights to lapse into the public domain.
50
  This is often 
referred to as an abandonment of IP rights. 
In fact, one study shows that between 70% and 80% of patents owned 
by U.S. corporations are considered orphan technology.
51
  In 2003, the 
Internal Revenue Service also reported that approximately two-thirds of all 
U.S. patents were allowed to lapse and were ultimately abandoned within 
12 years of their issuance.
52
  This merely reemphasizes the patents‘ 
uselessness and lack of commercial value.
53
 
Many of the donated patents are simply defensive patents that 
corporations developed to protect their original holders when the patents 
were competitive.
54
  Thus, many of the donated patents have no value 
outside of that competitive role.
55
  Further, if the patent or other IP right did 
have any commercial value, corporations would license the patents for 
profit, as opposed to donating them.
56
 
Not surprisingly, in many cases, the recipient universities found that 
the patents received could not be developed or used, and thus, abandoned 
them to avoid maintenance and enforcement expenses.
57
  In such cases, the 
corporations would receive an excessive tax deduction, in addition to the 
elimination of their maintenance fees, in exchange for something that had 
no value to the universities or society.  The donated patents would have 
been abandoned and passed into the public domain, because the cost of 
commercialization would have been too high while the probability of 
 
 47. Layton & Bloch, supra note 2, at 30. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Dubiansky, supra note 16, at 297. 
 50. Id. 
 51. RON LAYTON & PETER BLOCH, INT‘L INTELLECTUAL PROP. INST., IP DONATIONS: A 
POLICY REVIEW 9 (2004). 
 52. Craig & Moore, supra note 15, at 3. 
 53. See id. (―[T]he majority of [donated] patents possessed no potential for 
commercialisation or social benefit.‖). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Dubiansky, supra note 16, at 303-04 (stating that the only patents that 
corporations would consider giving away for donations are IP rights that lack a ready 
commercial application). 
 57. Craig & Moore, supra note 15, at 3. 
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success too low.
58
 
Additionally, some critics even contend that many of the current IP 
rights are mere ―functional forgeries.‖
59
  Their contention is that some 
patents are based on the uniqueness of the words used to describe the 
invention rather than on the uniqueness of the invention itself.
60
  
Receiving tax deductions through donations, however, was a more 
attractive means of disposing unneeded patents to corporations rather than 
simply abandoning them.
61
  Therefore, even with the AJCA, the money that 
the corporations save from not having to incur costs of maintaining patents, 
along with the moderate deductions still allowed by the current system, 
may possibly continue incentivizing corporations to donate their IP rights 
to nonprofit organizations.
62
  Furthermore, corporations may even donate 
IP rights that are capable of being licensed if the value of the allowable tax 
deduction exceeds the value of achievable licensing fees.
63
 
B.  Waste Problems – Revisited 
Viewed another way, the tax deduction system allows corporations to 
gain a windfall through donations of IP rights that they otherwise would 
have abandoned.  Donating such patents or other IP rights constitute a cost 
to society.  The donations essentially lower the number of patents or other 
IP rights that would have naturally passed into the public domain through 
abandonment.  This, in effect, ―robs‖ society of property that could have 
belonged to it.  Although there may still be problems associated with 
locating the abandoned IP rights, if those rights passed into the public 
domain, any nonprofit organization would at least have had the right to 
utilize them. 
Giving credit to the waste argument, however, the benefits realized 
through donated IP rights have been and still are very real.  In fact, DuPont, 
Eastman, and Proctor & Gamble have donated patents to universities, 
hospitals, and nonprofit organizations that enabled commercialization of 
 
 58. LAYTON & BLOCH, supra note 51, at 7-8. 
 59. Patent Donations and the Problem of Orphan Technologies: A Policy Forum on 
The Intangible Economy with David Martin & Peter Bloch at the Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars, ATHENAALLIANCE.ORG (Apr. 14, 2004), 
http://www.athenaalliance.org/pdf/PatentDonationSumm.pdf. 
 60. See id. (noting that a significant amount of patents may be granted regardless of 
their ultimate validity due to the fee-based system of the Patent and Trademark Office). 
 61. Dubiansky, supra note 16, at 297. 
 62. Id. at 304 (―[A]ny deduction amount that exceeds the transaction costs associated 
with locating and managing a patent donation would be sufficient to motivate that 
donation.‖). 
 63. Id. at 304 n.57. 
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significant products.
64
  Many such success stories of donated IP rights 
exist.
65
 
Some university staffs have also confirmed the positive effects and 
impact of IP donations on the quality of educational opportunities for 
students.
66
  Further, donated patents could provide an avenue for improving 
the lives, safety, and health of not only Americans, but people around the 
world.
67
 
The reason for this could be attributed in part to the fact that academic 
and corporate industries hold vastly different goals and interests, causing 
them to operate in very different ways.
68
  Most of the nonprofit 
organization donees are in the realm of the academic world, while the 
donors are in the corporate world.  It is, therefore, not difficult to imagine 
that some IP rights only find their way into the marketplace or prove to be 
useful through nonprofit organizations.
69
  Lending further credence to the 
waste argument, donated patents could also provide an avenue for 
commercialization.
70
 
For these reasons, it is clear that there are many potential benefits 
associated with donated IP rights.  Therefore, stripping away the possibility 
of such benefits could be viewed as social waste.  Even with such great 
potential, however, there is room to argue that robbing society of those 
rights, by choosing donation over abandonment, is more ―wasteful.‖  Stated 
differently, preventing the IP rights from passing into the public domain in 
order for corporations to abuse the tax deduction structure may be more 
 
 64. See Craig & Moore, supra note 15 and accompanying text (noting that there have 
been successes along the way as a result of the donated patents). 
 65. See, e.g., DAVID MARTIN, SPECIAL REPORT: PATENT DONATIONS – THE TALE OF 
INTANGIBLES 14-19 (2003), available at http://www.m-
cam.com/downloads/20030108_donation-whitepaper.pdf (stating that DuPont‘s donations 
of new papermaking patent right to the University of Maine may reduce operating costs and 
improve environmental performance for paper mills; Boeing‘s patent donation to the 
University of Pennsylvania could help treat bone disease and injuries; patent donation 
websites could help buy computers for local youth; General Motors and Delphi‘s display 
technology donation could be explored by Brown researchers; Kellogg‘s patent donation 
could strengthen research; and Procter & Gamble‘s patent donations could lead to new 
medicines). 
 66. See LAYTON & BLOCH, supra note 51, at 16 (―Students and teachers are often 
afforded opportunities to pursue research that would not be possible without donated 
patents.‖). 
 67. See id. (using the Institute for One World Health, a nonprofit pharmaceutical 
company, to illustrate the possibilities for development in such an arena). 
 68. Id. at 8. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Jeremy Bond, Leveraging Patent Donation to Grow Technology-Based 
Businesses, ECON. DEV. NOW, May 21, 2007, at 1, available at 
http://www.thecati.com/news/IEDC_EDNow_052107.pdf (explaining the potential for 
patent donations to enhance the commercialization of technology-based businesses, such as 
one that produces fumigant technology). 
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wasteful than preventing the IP rights from falling into the hands of 
nonprofit organizations.  This argument still holds ground regardless of 
whether the IP rights would have fallen into the hands of the ―right‖ 
donees. 
In light of the fact that most donated patents would have been 
abandoned anyway, some critics may even argue that donating patents to a 
singular university harms society by preventing other universities from 
using those patents.
71
  After all, if the IP rights were abandoned, any 
nonprofit organization would be justified in utilizing the rights to create the 
previously noted benefits.  Such use would not be limited to the one 
specified donee.  Therefore, the potential benefits of a corporation‘s 
abandonment of IP rights could be even greater than its specified donation 
to a ―good fit‖ nonprofit organization. 
Additionally, proponents of the AJCA have argued that the AJCA 
itself gives enough incentive to donors to place the patent or other 
intellectual property into the right hands and prevents waste in doing so.
72
  
As noted before, the potential for future deductions would provide some 
incentive for corporation to find good fit donees. 
Notwithstanding these arguments that support the AJCA, however, 
there are still many flaws and much waste associated with the current 
system.  First of all, many resources are wasted in calculating the value of 
the IP.  The only easy case for calculating the taxpayer‘s basis is when the 
taxpayer buys the IP from a third party.
73
  Otherwise, calculating the basis 
of a self-created IP can be very difficult.
74
  For example, calculating such a 
basis would involve attempting to allocate the research and development 
expenses as well as other internal costs.
75
 
The same holds true for valuing the IP right‘s fair market value, which 
may be necessary to compare to the taxpayer‘s basis.  For example, patents 
can involve untested technology, which gives no ready market that allows 
setting of comparables as is the case with real property.
76
  The unique 
nature of most IP rights causes havoc in trying to set comparison values to 
any given specific IP. 
A commonly used valuation method for IP rights consists of 
 
 71. See Dubiansky, supra note 16, at 304 (―Abandonment, in contrast, would open up 
the innovation race to other universities as well, putting pressure on all institutions to 
develop the technology.‖). 
 72. Riley & Cammarano, supra note 5, at 217. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. (stating that computing the basis in self-created patents, trademarks, and other 
types of intellectual property may involve difficult issues of allocating research and 
development expenses and other internal costs). 
 76. Craig & Moore, supra note 15, at 5. 
WOOFINALIZED_FIVE_UPDATED 3/23/2011  4:50 PM 
538 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 13:2 
 
measuring the income generated by a mid-size company in the same field.
77
  
However, even with such a model, risk factors are often underestimated 
and appraising the value requires building hypothetical models.
78
  Critics 
also point to the fact that patents in most cases cannot be commercialized 
until a significant amount of research and development has been 
conducted.
79
  Further, in order to commercialize the patent, the research and 
development efforts must also yield success.
80
 
In addition to waste associated with valuing IP rights, a large amount 
of business resources are wasted in researching nonprofit organizations in 
an effort to place the IP rights into the right hands.
81
  As some critics have 
mentioned, such resources could be spent on developing new products 
instead.
82
 
One may argue that the social value of placing the IP into the right 
hands outweighs the administrative costs associated with finding the right 
match.  However, if the value of donating, which is uncertain at best, does 
not exceed the cost of donating, the corporation would simply not donate.  
This exemplifies the incentive problem discussed above. 
V.  CRITICS SPEAK – EFFORTS TO SOLVE THE AJCA PROBLEMS 
Both the pre-AJCA and post-AJCA proponents have valid arguments.  
Several scholars have therefore attempted to combine the two systems and 
develop a fix-all solution to the current debates.  Many of the proposals, 
however, do not address the main issues.  Additionally, the proposals that 
do address these issues produce added waste components due to an 
inefficient use of government resources. 
For example, several scholars propose that the government require 
increased accountability on the part of charitable donees.
83
  They want 
Congress to ensure that both the donors and the donees are responsible for 
accurate valuation.
84
  A requirement that puts an additional burden on the 
donees, however, would discourage them from accepting the donations.  
This in turn decreases the chances of a university or other nonprofit 
organization from utilizing potentially valuable IP rights, and thus may 
deprive society of potential benefits and impede the progress of future 
science. 
 
 77. LAYTON & BLOCH, supra note 51, at 7. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. (―The uncertainties include the possibility the patents will expire before the 
necessary R&D is finished.‖). 
 81. Tomlinson, supra note 34, at 203. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Nguyen & Maine, supra note 33, at 1766. 
 84. Id. 
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Other scholars have suggested giving valuation premiums to provide 
donors with additional economic incentives.
85
  They suggested an 
alternative system that gives donors a choice between taking a single fair 
market value deduction in the year of contribution and taking future 
deductions based on the donee‘s income resulting from the donated IP.
86
  In 
their view, encouraging donations through economic incentives ultimately 
benefits society by giving purely scientific research to non-commercially-
driven donees.
87
  This would, however, allow corporations to receive tax 
deductions which are, at a minimum, the same amount as the pre-AJCA era 
and potentially a lot more.  Such a proposal, therefore, completely ignores 
Congress‘ overvaluation concerns prior to the enactment of the AJCA. 
These proposals also fail to balance the benefits of encouraging 
donations while minimizing the abuse committed by big corporations.  
Bear in mind that the corporations are donating patents or other IP rights 
that are useless to them; they are not actually ―sacrificing‖ anything, but 
rather dumping their unused property onto nonprofit organizations. 
Nevertheless, the American Society of Appraisers (ASA) suggested 
that the IRS improve the previous fair market value donation system by:  1) 
strictly defining a ―qualified appraiser‖ since the current regulation allows 
almost anyone to appraise the value of the IP without professional training; 
2) establishing a mandatory valuation guideline for the appraisal of 
property; and 3) monitoring for high value donations.
88
  It argues that this 
proposal solves the overvaluation problem, even though there is difficulty 
in setting a workable standard for valuing IP.  If this were true, such a 
proposal would still fail to create incentive for the donor to find donees that 
would best use the donated IP rights.
89
 
In criticizing the ASA‘s suggestion, one scholar offers a ―hybrid‖ 
policy that would purportedly address and solve both the overvaluation and 
incentive problems, while allowing the IP rights to fall into the hands of a 
suitable donee.
90
  He proposes the use of the original fair market value 
deduction with an additional component of a broker to help ensure that the 
best suited donee gains access to the donated IP.
91
  In other words, he wants 
 
 85. Id. at 1767. 
 86. Id. at 1769. 
 87. See id. at 1770 (stating that the best way to encourage giving is not by relying solely 
on moral or social incentives, but by providing strong economic incentives to do so). 
 88. Don MacBean, Better to Give Than to Receive: Evaluating Recent IP Donation Tax 
Policy Changes, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 19, ¶ 18 (2005), available at 
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/ 
2005dltr0019.html. 
 89. See id. ¶¶ 19-20 (critiquing ASA‘s suggestion for stopping short of creating 
incentives for the donor to find the best suited donee for their donations). 
 90. Id. ¶¶ 25-29. 
 91. Id. ¶ 25. 
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to allow full fair market value deductions as determined by a qualified 
appraiser, only if the corporations use a third party broker whose primary 
goal is matching donors with appropriate donees.
92
 
This scholar also proposes that there be strict requirements for 
appraiser qualifications and that the broker be a government entity or a 
government-funded nonprofit organization for the particular purpose of 
matching donors to donees.
93
  Although the scholar recognizes that 
assigning a broker with expertise in a wide variety of IP fields who is also 
able to regularly maintain contact with universities and other donees is not 
an easy task, he believes that it is still possible.
94
  He even suggests having 
professionals do the work on a pro bono basis and monitoring conflicts of 
interest carefully.
95
 
There are several problems with this scholar‘s suggestions.  First of 
all, using professionals on a pro bono basis would be neither practical nor 
consistent.  Finding brokers who would be willing to do such tasks in 
exchange for monetary payment would prove to be a challenging task in 
and of itself, due to the variety of specializations that are required for the 
job.  Having professionals address these tasks as a pro bono assignment 
would not offer enough incentive for most brokers to remain committed to 
the program. 
This leads us to another problem regarding the use of government 
resources.  The ―hybrid‖ proposal would require two separate 
organizations:  1) a qualified appraiser that is strictly defined; and 2) a 
matchmaking broker to find suitable donees for the donated IP rights.  If 
one or both of these organizations prove to be infeasible on a pro bono 
basis, which is the more likely scenario, the government would have to 
utilize its own resources to create such organizations. 
Having such a system in place, however, is not impossible.  For 
example, using already existing third party organizations to find donation 
suitors could help bring about this reform.  Some charities have already 
established programs to exploit patents so that beneficial products may be 
developed.
96
  Other charities simply sell or license the patents to other 
companies that can better utilize the patents.
97
 
Thus, the ideas of this ―hybrid‖ proposal are worth noting, especially 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. ¶ 30. 
 94. Id. ¶ 26. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Drennan, supra note 30, at 1131 (stating that ―Think Detroit‖ established a 
website allowing businesses to donate unused patents to universities that will be most 
capable of using the patent). 
 97. See id. at 1131-32 (stating that Ohio IP Collaborative takes donated patents and 
―sells or licenses [them] to small manufacturers interested in commercializing the 
technology‖) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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since using such a third party broker would most likely decrease the 
probability that the IP rights would go to waste.
98
  There are, however, 
more efficient ways of utilizing government resources.  The ―hybrid‖ 
proposal would lead to a significant waste of time and resources in valuing 
IP rights, regardless of whether it is through a ―qualified appraiser‖ or not.  
Third party brokers, whose only purpose is matching donees with donors, 
would also require a lot of time, effort, and resources.  In sum, the 
administrative costs associated with the hybrid proposal would most likely 
result in a tremendous waste of government resources. 
VI.  TWO PROPOSALS AND WHAT THE CRITICS OVERLOOKED 
Admittedly, there will always be some problems and costs associated 
with valuing IP rights because of the inherent difficulty of this task, 
regardless of whether we are calculating the taxpayer‘s basis or the fair 
market value.
99
  If possible, however, the government should try to 
minimize the amount of administrative and transaction costs associated 
with each donation.  Adding more agencies or third party organizations 
would only inhibit this objective. 
Critics tend to overlook that the current AJCA system already makes 
an effort to solve the overvaluation problem, while also addressing the 
policy of incentivizing corporations to donate to the proper donees.  
Congress dealt with the overvaluation problem by only allowing the lesser 
of the tax payers‘ basis or the fair market value of the IP right.
100
  As a 
result, the AJCA has very limited immediate benefits and most of the real 
benefits, if any at all, are only realized in years following the donation.
101
  
This was Congress‘ way of encouraging corporations to donate to the 
―appropriate‖ donees. 
Some may still argue that the incentives to donate are only realizable 
if the benefits for donating are immediate.
102
  Thus, critics are still able to 
argue that corporations do not have much incentive to donate under the 
current AJCA system.  As noted before, however, the critics may have 
over-exaggerated the incentive problem that exists with the current system. 
 
 98. MacBean, supra note 88, ¶ 30. 
 99. Id. ¶ 19. 
 100. Gerzog, supra note 25, at 1143. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See Drennan, supra note 30, at 1130 (―[A] firm may prefer to donate the invention 
to a public charity, avoid the transaction costs, and claim an immediate fair market value tax 
deduction.‖). 
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A.  Practical Fix – Addressing the Incentive Problem 
The most practical fix is simple and addresses most of Congress‘ 
concerns as well as the concerns of AJCA‘s critics.  The main criticism of 
the AJCA seems to be that corporations would no longer be incentivized to 
donate to charities,
103
  thus wasting potentially valuable patents or other IP 
rights that could be used by nonprofit organizations.  Critics argue that 
administrative costs associated with finding a charity that would be able to 
effectively use the IP—thus allowing corporations to take advantage of the 
AJCA system—would be considerable.
104
  They reason that corporations 
would not likely want to expend such efforts and resources in finding a 
good fit, especially in light of the uncertain future benefits in having any 
worthwhile tax deductions.
105
 
These concerns do not seem to take into consideration that 
corporations would still be incurring costs by maintaining the IP rights.
106
  
As previously mentioned, the patents or other IP rights that corporations 
donate are typically ones that would have passed into the public domain via 
abandonment—they essentially hold a negative value to the corporation. 
However, assuming arguendo that these considerations do not exist, 
most of the aforementioned concerns could still be addressed without 
taking any drastic measures.  In other words, we could still maintain the 
basic structure of the current AJCA system and minimize the 
administrative and transaction costs associated with creating new agencies, 
without completely revamping the existing tax deduction structure yet 
again. 
We could substantially mitigate the concerns of the various scholars 
without incurring the associated costs by maintaining the current system of 
the AJCA and simply allowing additional deductions to corporations for 
any expenditures they incur in preparing the donation.  The additional 
deductible monetary costs would include administrative costs, transaction 
costs, and any other costs incurred in finding an appropriate donee. 
Given this relatively minor, yet cost-effective fix, companies would 
not be at a ―loss‖ when donating their IP rights to nonprofit organizations.  
At the very least, they would be able to recover any costs associated with 
finding a suitable donee and at the same time be given a moderate tax 
deduction for the IP rights that they would have abandoned anyway. 
There could be, however, some possible limitations to this proposal as 
 
 103. Riley & Cammarano, supra note 5, at 216. 
 104. Nguyen & Maine, supra note 33, at 1762. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Layton & Bloch, supra note 2, at 30 (stating that IP portfolio auditors were 
largely concerned with the overhead wasted on paying maintenance fees for ―orphan‖ 
patents). 
WOOFINALIZED_FIVE_UPDATED 3/23/2011  4:50 PM 
2011] CHARITABLE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DONATIONS 543 
 
well.  Critics may argue, for example, that the proposal still does not give 
enough incentive for corporations to donate to the same extent as during 
the pre-AJCA era.  Although these critics might claim that compensating 
fair market value is the only way to incentivize corporations to donate their 
IP rights, this article solution should be sufficient to solve most of the 
incentive problems. 
Critics on the opposite end of the spectrum, however, may argue that 
under this proposal corporations are still getting a windfall for their useless 
patents.  This is certainly true.  A cost-benefit analysis, however, may 
reveal that the benefits of incentivizing corporations to donate to good fit 
donees could outweigh the benefits of having the IP rights fall into the 
public domain.  While this proposal is not the best solution possible, it 
would be the easiest fix to the current system without having to completely 
redo the entire tax deduction system. 
B.  Drastic Fix – Donation Bank 
If Congress is willing to take more drastic measures by creating third 
party institutions, there is another proposal that would better address these 
problems.  Many of the previous proposals have suggested monitoring 
overvaluation of IP, having appraisers determine the fair market value of 
the IP rights, or having third party brokers match donors to donees.  All of 
these proposals naturally have transaction and administrative costs 
associated with them. 
However, rather than using such extensive government resources in 
these efforts, we could create a government-sponsored third party 
organization with a moderate fund whose sole purpose would be to 
maintain a public ―donation bank‖ of all donated IP rights.  This third party 
institution would not enforce the donated IP rights, but merely be assigned 
the task of keeping track of the donated IP and organizing them in a 
manner that would facilitate searches. 
With the rapid development of software technology, it would be 
relatively cheap and easy to create a system that could keep track of all the 
donated IP rights in an orderly fashion, including information regarding the 
nature and substance of the rights.  Although this may not be a simple task, 
creating such an institution would provide a more well-defined, less costly 
solution that would be easier to implement than creating the organizations 
proposed by the above critics. 
1.  How it Works 
With such a third party in place, the corporations would simply submit 
their donations to this ―donation bank,‖ and would still be able to deduct 
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the appropriate administrative costs spent in preparing the donation, in 
addition to the deductions offered by the current AJCA system.  These 
administrative costs, however, should be held to a minimum with the 
proposed system, due to the effortless process of submitting donations.  
The corporations also would not need to use brokers or spend additional 
resources in researching nonprofit organizations that would be a good fit; 
neither would they have to use qualified appraisers as proposed by some of 
the critics to value their IP rights. 
On the donees‘ side, nonprofit organizations would be allowed to 
independently access, search, and obtain the IP rights that they think are 
potentially beneficial to their respective organizations in this ―donation 
bank.‖  The search should be relatively interactive and easy, especially 
since all the IP donations would be going to one central location. 
With this proposed system, the IP rights would essentially be 
distributed on a first-come, first-serve basis.  The first nonprofit 
organization to claim a particular IP right from the donation bank would 
obtain the rights to it.  Before handing over the rights, however, the 
nonprofit institution would have the burden of proving that it has the 
expertise and resources to effectively use the right.  The unclaimed IP 
rights from the donation bank would pass into the public domain after a 
period of time, just like any other abandoned IP. 
The original donor of the IP right would also be able to obtain the 
same benefits in a similar manner as the donor would under the current 
AJCA system.  This includes the deductions in subsequent years, if and 
when the nonprofit organizations gain revenue associated with the donated 
property.  As a result, the nonprofit donees would also be required to 
submit the appropriate paperwork associated with the subsequent 
deductions.  Critics have indicated that such a system places additional 
burdens on the donees, and thus would deter them from accepting the IP 
rights.  That criticism may only hold true for the current AJCA system. 
With this new proposal, corporations are not simply dumping all their 
useless IP rights onto the laps of the nonprofit organizations.  Rather, the 
donees are the ones actively searching for the IP right that they need or 
want because of its potential utility to their organization.  Therefore, in 
their minds, the minimum amount of required paperwork would not likely 
be a deterrent, but be outweighed by the benefits associated with obtaining 
the IP right. 
2.  Policy Considerations 
Critics of the AJCA have constantly argued that good policy should 
not only target the known abusers, but create appropriate incentives for IP 
holders to donate their property to nonprofit organizations that are capable 
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of putting the IP to good use.
107
  The proposed system would benefit 
society by doing just this. 
Naysayers may argue that, without a fair-market-value-type incentive 
structure, corporations would be unwilling to donate and it would be 
unlikely that good fits would be found for the IP rights.  The main criticism 
that corporations would be disincentivized from donating, however, was 
based on the costs that the corporations had to incur, such as costs in 
finding appropriate nonprofit organizations.
108
  Not only are most of these 
costs eliminated with the proposed system, but as previously mentioned, 
corporations are still better off without their orphan IP rights due to the 
costs of maintaining and enforcing them.
109
 
Further, many of the proposals suggested by the AJCA critics yield a 
large amount of costs in wasted resources.  The simplified donation 
procedure of the proposed system would minimize the transaction costs, 
administrative costs, and overall societal costs that are associated with the 
other proposals.  The corporations simply have to donate their IP rights to 
one place:  no searching required, no valuation required, and no non-
deductable cost incurred. 
This simplified donation process, along with the other benefits 
associated with donating, ought to be sufficient incentive for corporations 
to donate.  These associated benefits include a moderate initial tax 
exemption, elimination of maintenance costs, deductions on donation costs, 
and even potential for future deductions.  This system could be 
implemented without having to waste resources or carrying the costs, 
burden, and hassle of finding a ―good fit‖ charity, as is the case under the 
current AJCA system. 
In addition to all the advantages of this proposal, the fact that the 
―unclaimed‖ donations would essentially pass into the public domain as 
abandoned property allows society to enjoy the abandoned IP rights freely 
as well.
110
  In short, this proposal benefits corporations by providing them 
with tax deductions, benefits nonprofits by allowing them to claim and 
obtain suitable IP rights, and benefits society by adding to the public 
domain.  Nonprofit organizations would therefore be allowed to utilize 
their newly acquired potentially valuable IP rights while contributing to the 
advancement and progression of science. 
This proposal may initially have a slow start.  Once the system is in 
place, however, corporations would know where to donate and nonprofit 
organizations would know where to turn for potentially valuable IP rights.  
 
 107. MacBean, supra note 88, at ¶ 15. 
 108. Riley & Cammarano, supra note 5, at 218. 
 109. Layton & Bloch, supra note 2, at 30. 
 110. In practice, however, these abandoned rights are not likely to be useful nor are they 
likely to be capable of commercialization. 
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Such a system would be a much more efficient and effective way of placing 
IP rights into the appropriate hands, as opposed to using third party brokers 
or incentivizing corporations through fair market value deductions.  History 
has already proven that the latter choice is subject to abuse. 
Furthermore, the proposed system would not deter the corporation-
university relationships, which has been the concern of some critics.
111
  
With such a system, corporations may still build relationships with the 
universities and notify them of an available and suitable IP right if such 
opportunities arise.  This proposed system would merely prevent 
corporations from having to proactively search for such organizations and 
wasting resources in the process.  More importantly, there would be no 
pressure for the nonprofit organizations to make use of IP rights that they 
may not find useful, and no room for corporations to resent the nonprofits 
for failing to do so. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Although Congress attempted to address the corporations‘ abuse of the 
tax deduction system through the AJCA, the legislation has created new 
problems of its own.  By implementing minor fixes to the current system or 
through the creation of a simple third party organization, however, most of 
these problems can be resolved.  If empirical evidence later shows that 
corporations have been donating significantly less after the enactment of 
the AJCA, Congress should seriously consider these proposals in revising 
the tax structure. 
 
 111. Riley & Cammarano, supra note 5, at 218. 
